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the case for individual freedom rests chiefly on the recognition of the inevitable 
ignorance of all of us concerning a great number of factors on which the achievement of 
our ends and welfare depends....   If there were omniscient men, if we only could know 
not only all that affects that attainment of our present wishes, but also the future wants 
and desires, there would be little case for liberty…. 1 
 There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio,  
Than are dreamt of in our philosophy.2 
Abstract 
Bernard Williams has noted the tendency of certain types of political thought 
to inform past societies about their moral failings. This is certainly true of the history 
and political thought focussed on indigenous peoples, whether written by indigenous 
or non-indigenous scholars. In such writing, contemporary conceptions of justice 
are used to find the actions of past colonial governments immoral thus justifying the 
scholars conclusions as to the moral rights of rectification. Avoiding the obvious 
and much traversed methodological problems in the production of such histories, I 
focus instead on the denial of indigenous voice and self-determination that is 
enabled by such moralism. I do so by noting the exclusion of indigenous peoples 
from the basic political demands that we all have, and could expect from any 
political authority, indigenous or non- indigenous: in particular the enforcing of 
property rules, but also stability, order, the conditions of co-operation etc. I suggest 
that by thinking through how best to theorise an answer to those demands by 
indigenous peoples, political theory (and in turn, politics itself) would turn to the 
actual political demands of indigenous peoples, and not the moralising imaginations 
of scholars.  
Introduction  
There are myriad ways in which an indigenous political theorist might think 
through the reconciliation of indigeneity with the post-colonial worlds of settler nations 
such as Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.  So I choose to start at the very beginning 
of politics, with the very first question to be answered: why the state? In other words, 
what would make reconciliation possible. 
 
                                                 
1 Friedrich A. von Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), 29. 
2 W Shakespeare, "The Complete Works. Ed. Stanley Wells and Gary Taylor", Compact Edition (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1988), Hamlet, Act 1 Scene 5, 699. This proem was the theme for the paper before the 
earthquake struck Christchurch, but seems all the more suitable now.  I mention this also to note that the 
paper was completed without the aid of a university library. 
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This paper argues that the first question raised by the presence of indigenous 
peoples in a modern polity is not whether justice has occurred, is occurring, or might 
occur between indigenous and non-indigenous groups, but why indigenous peoples need 
be concerned with obeying or the state in the first place.  I make this argument against 
the political moralism of scholars and policy-makers who suggest a particular a priori set 
of ethics should shape a political system, so that it is ‗just‘ for indigenous peoples.  Such 
attempts imagine on behalf of indigenous peoples what rights and resources a just state 
would give those peoples.  I suggest that indigenous peoples can very well 
(self)determine their own political goals and activities to achieve the rights they require 
from the modern state. The first step for political theorising about indigeneity and the 
state would be to find out what goals and activities indigenous peoples actually have, 
rather than moralising about what they ought to be.3 In other words, I want to insist that 
relations between Maori (and other indigenous groups) and the state, as for other 
peoples, depends – as always – on individual self-determination or choice, and not the 
applied morality of a government. 
The justification for allowing the individual to (self)determine their modes of 
political existence needs only a passing glance.4 After all, it is not only the neo-liberal 
economists, like Hayek, who think that ―no one can attain a point of Archimedean 
leverage on and distance from society such that any synoptic knowledge of it is available 
to him,‖5 nor is it only libertarians that suggest we should not attempt to moralise the 
political choices of other – indigenous or otherwise – individuals.   Indeed, it was Milan 
Kundera, writing in Eastern Europe who suggested that the human condition of the 
                                                 
3 I take this thought from the recent attacks on the dominant ‗political moralism‘ of contemporary political 
theory, ‗where [the theorising ]is something like applied morality.‘ Bernard Williams, In the Beginning Was the 
Deed, ed. Geoffrey Hawthorn (Princeton; NJ: Princeton, 2005), 2. Critics of the moralising approach, such 
as Williams and A. John Simmons, have identified its method as based in the attempt to derive political 
legitimacy from an account of individual morality.  This may help philosopher kings, but as early as 
Machiavelli, it became obvious that political legitimacy (as in stability) is about much else besides. A. John 
Simmons, Justification and Legitimacy: Essays on Rights and Obligations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001), 140-1; Williams, In the Beginning, 9.  Both Williams and Raymond Geuss have advocated a return to a 
more realistic approach on the basis that political moralism creates ideal imaginings about politics which 
are no guide to political action e.g. ‗the often noted absence in Rawls of any theory about how his ideal 
demands are to be implemented is not a tiny mole that serves as a beauty spot to set off the radiance of the 
rest of the face, but the epidermal sign of a lethal tumour.‘ Raymond Geuss, Philosophy and Real Politics 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 94.  See also special issue of European Journal of 
political thought 2010 (Mar??) 
4 I should like to emphasise here that this is political theory, and focuses on the responsibilities of the 
political institutions.  What responsibilities society, and its individuals, might have for culture, recognition, 
indigeneity is beyond my purview.  Which is my point; imagining the most ‗reasonable‘ responses of a 
society about the politics of indigeneity (which is what a political moralist might do) seems rather self-
defeating given the historical record of a lack of any kind reasonableness shown toward indigenous people.   
5 John Gray, "Hayek on Liberty, Rights, and Justice", Ethics, vol. 92, no. 1 (1981), 82. 
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‗difficulty of knowing and the elusiveness of truth‘6 means that our individual wisdoms 
cannot be captured, by one thought, one idea, one institution, or by one idea of 
government.  Yet, this insight seems oft forgot by those who write, think and make 
policy about, the political claims of indigenous people... When governing indigenous 
people, modern society reverts to more traditional and less democratic patterns of 
politics, where elites decide, without consultation, the policy that will apply. That is, could 
the Northern Territory Emergency Response legislative package possibly survive 
politically in application to any community but an indigenous one?  Could the New 
Zealand Government‘s response to the Foreshore and Seabed survive politically if the 
rights in question were denied to any group other than the indigenous population?   
Indigenous rights imagined 
Too often scholarly writing and thus practical policy-making7 tells indigenous 
peoples in settler colonies how to reconcile the traditional and the modern, rather than 
allowing those indigenous individuals to choose the best way themselves.  There is, ‗a 
forgetting of being‘ that allows government to forget the vital lesson of which the market 
liberal resurgence of the 1980‘s reminded us (if we ever needed it): the state doesn‘t 
automatically know best.  This is particularly apt where the state is dealing with a people 
who may (or may not) choose very different conceptions of the good life, including those  
individuals who have contact (or wish to make contact) with what they perceive to be 
traditional ways of life.  This brings me to the proem with which I headed this paper 
‗There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio,  
Than are dreamt of in our philosophy.‘8 
I use that quote as a double edged sword to chop the political theory of 
indigeneity into little pieces.  Swinging one way I provide evidence as to how easily and 
naturally moralising the politics of indigeneity (indigenous-state relations) leads to the 
                                                 
6 M Kundera, The Art of the Novel, trans. Linda Asher (London: Faber and Faber, 1988), 18. 
7 While in some areas of political theory or political studies there is little movement between academia and 
policy, in indigenous studies the cross-over is vast.  The most obvious international example is James 
Anaya‘s status as both almost the most important legal scholar on international indigenous rights, and the 
UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous 
Peoples. Domestically, however, the state utilises indigenous academics, or academics writing on 
indigenous matters constantly.  This at least allows indigenous voice to enter the government policy 
process.  However where that voice is dictating what I, if I am to be truly indigenous, should eat, I do 
somewhat take against the practice: e.g. the conclusions of two respectable north American indigenous 
academics, that in order to ‗reflect a shift to an Indigenous reality from the colonized places we inhabit 
today in our minds and in our souls‘  indigenous peoples are exhorted to ―Decolonize  your  Diet  –  our  
people  must  regain  the  self-sufficient capacity to provide our own food, clothing, shelter and medicines.‘ 
Taiaiake Alfred and Jeff Corntassel, "Being Indigenous: Resurgences against Contemporary Colonialism", 
Government and Opposition, vol. 40, no. 4 (2005), 612-13. 
8 Shakespeare, "The Complete Works", 699. 
4/16 
 
misrepresentation of indigenous peoples. Cutting the other way, I argue that government 
has a duty to assist those peoples in their self-determination, where I mean literally the 
ability of the individual to decide the political goals and actions that are appropriate to 
that individual. 
First then, to demonstrate the misrepresentation of indigenous peoples political 
ambitions in the prevalent ideas of indigenous rights in the academy and government.  
The types of indigenous rights I wish to critique are those generated by an appeal to the 
injustice indigenous peoples have suffered, where that injustice is judged by a priori moral 
standards of a particular scholar or theory of ethics. An example of such political 
moralism is the view that given the enormous inequalities in power between indigenous 
and non-indigenous peoples, research on indigenous subjects must be done only by 
indigenous peoples. In order to take such a view, one would have to make assumptions 
about a number of other concepts, such as sovereignty, having a legal system capable of 
enforcing such rights (unless they are to be entirely utopic), and a state that wishes to do 
justice to indigenous peoples.  Most importantly, one would think, such a claim should 
have evidence of the political desires of indigenous peoples themselves.  Yet, even 
among indigenous scholars themselves, there is little to no evidence of any social science, 
or even anecdotes about the concrete political desires of individual indigenous peoples or 
communities. Instead, the views of indigenous peoples are deemed to be synonymous 
with the principles of the particular theory used to frame claims made on behalf of 
indigenous peoples.9   
The paucity of indigenous views in the scholarly literature turns that literature 
from an attempt at doing justice, into an sanctimonious little pity party staged in the 
academy for any number of peoples who have no need of pity, and much need for 
freedom – particularly in some parts of Australia - from government interventions based 
on influential scholarly political philosophies.  This seems particularly damaging since 
there are concrete problems serious enough without imagining more moralistic utopias: 
attempting to remove health disparities so that mortality was reduced would give Maori 
10 years on average longer to live, and Indigenous Australians 20 years.  Further the 
paucity of empirical study has real effects even on the institutions of law; the incoherent 
and incontinent pleading of the Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples is a 
                                                 
9 See for instance the seminal text in indigenous research; LT Smith, Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and 
Indigenous Peoples (London: Zed Books, 1999).  For a sensitive and deeply wise, but nevertheless devastating, 
dismissal of the political ambitions of Smith‘s book see S Hope, "Self-Determination and Cultural 
Difference", Political Science, vol. 58, no. 1 (2006). 
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massive failure, since the controversy surrounding its adoption suggests it has almost no 
chance of providing a basis for legally binding rights.10   
The misrepresentation of indigenous peoples in political theory 
For the purposes of illustrating the problems in the political theory on indigenous 
claims, given space constraints, I have chosen the arguments of two important and 
influential scholars; Jeremy Waldron and James Tully.  These authors are chosen because 
they both accept that historical injustice was done, accept that it suggests rights of some 
kind ought to be allocated, but are at either end of the intellectual spectrum about the 
content of those rights.  Waldron discards the import of historical injustice in favour of 
ensuring equality of citizens (indigenous or non-indigenous) while Tully‘s argument uses 
the historical injustice to generate self-determination rights of indigenous people. 
Typically, however, they both get through their arguments without reference to a non-academic 
contemporary indigenous voice.  
It should be noted here, as I can get into trouble otherwise, that I do whakapapa 
(have an indigenous family history) although I hope to convey to the reader that my 
argument intends to judge political theory by its own standards, not by the terribly 
constricting standards of identity politics.  Indeed, I think part of the problem here is 
identity politics, because it necessarily makes indigenous identity central to the politics 
indigenous people encounter.  This is unhelpful since it is surely the political authorities 
and the actions of those authorities, not indigenous identities, that must prove their 
legitimacy to all members of a state, since it is the authorities that control the monopoly 
of force.   
 To return to the task at hand, I will first critique Jeremy Waldron‘s conclusion 
that indigenous peoples‘ entitlement to rights is no more than all other citizens, since the 
complexities of restoring the property rights renders those rights void.  Waldron starts 
his inquiry in this area with an intention to discover how one should examine historical 
grievances with a view to doing ‗justice to the legitimate grievances and claims of 
individuals in this context [of historic dispossession].‘11  If those individuals were alive, 
then there could be some direct restitution and compensation.  His suggestion, since they 
                                                 
10 See the statements of Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States justifying their (initial) 
refusal to sign the Declaration.  Of course, the declaration has great meaning and moral significance, but it 
many hoped that it would have substantive legal impact as well.  United Nations, "General Assembly 
Adopts Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peoples; ‗Major Step Forward‘ Towards Human Rights for 
All, Says President," in General Assembly 61st Session.  Plenary 107th & 108th Meetings (AM & PM), 13 
September 2007 (New York: Department of Public Information, News and Media Division, 2007). 
11 Jeremy Waldron, "Redressing Historic Injustice", University of Toronto Law Journal, vol. 52, no. 1 (2002), 
143. 
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are long dead, is that ‗the best hope of reparation is to make some sort of adjustment in 
the present circumstances of those descended from the persons who suffered the 
injustice…‘12 Without examining quite why, he then assumes that reparations those 
descendants are claiming, should ‗transform the present so that it matches as closely as 
possibly the way things would be now if the injustice had not occurred‘.13 After close 
philosophical investigation, Waldron decides that that the philosophical problems around 
such rectifications are too complicated.  For instance, he argues it is impossible to sustain 
a link between the property and the victim if the property is altered, since justice would 
then be based on a ‗best guess‘ at what rectification should be and that would be an odd 
foundation for property rights. Furthermore, removing those now occupying the land on 
the basis of illegal activity 100 years earlier would create another injustice.  In his own 
idiom, changed circumstances mean that the need to rectify the historical injustice of 
indigenous people losing their property rights is ‗superseded‘ by the ‗contemporary 
needs, claims, and deserts‘ of society today. 14   
  In a strict philosophical sense Waldron‘s argument against counterfactual justice 
is correct; the existential rights of the dead must give way to those living.15  But that is not 
my immediate concern.  Rather I want to suggest that no state process of indigenous 
property rectification (in Australia, Canada or New Zealand) is attempting to negotiate 
anything like his sense of rectification, nor does Waldron provide any evidence that 
indigenous peoples feel themselves entitled to full rectification of their property rights.  
Yet Waldron by implication and analogy suggests that indigenous peoples‘ (and 
particularly Maori) claims rely on the counterfactual speculation necessary for full 
rectification of property rights. Since one cannot base property rights on counterfactual 
speculation, Waldron argues, indigenous historic injustice claims fail to provide 
contemporary rights. 
                                                 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid., 144.  
14 Jeremy Waldron, "Settlement, Return, and the Supersession Thesis", Theoretical Inquiries in Law, vol. 5, no. 
2 (2004), 237-68; Waldron, "Redressing Historic Injustice", 135-60; Jeremy Waldron, "Historic Injustice: Its 
Remembrance and Supersession," in Justice, Ethics, and New Zealand, ed. Graham Oddie and Roy W. Perrett 
(Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992), 139-70; Jeremy Waldron, "Superseding Historic Injustice", 
Ethics, vol. 103, no. 4 (1992), 4-28. 
15 Waldron, "Redressing Historic Injustice", 240.The philosophical argument against attempting 
rectification based on counterfactuals is reasonably derivative. See Lawerence Davis, "Comments on 
Nozick‘s Entitlement Theory", The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 73, no. 21 (1976).and for a very clear 
examination of Waldron‘s argument see A. John Simmons, "Historical Rights and Fair Shares", Law and 
Philosophy, vol. 14, no. 2 (1995).This debate is more fully surveyed in Chapter Three ‗Property in the 
contemporary political philosophy of justice‘ of Lindsey Te Ata o Tu MacDonald, "The Political 
Philosophy of Property Rights" (Ph D, University of Canterbury, 2009). 
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It is always hard to prove the negative, but I certainly have never seen an 
indigenous claim to full rectification, and have often been surprised by indigenous 
leaders, pulling their punches so to speak, in their claims.16 It is a matter of descriptive 
fact that indigenous peoples, whose claims are local, specific and made in the language of 
Western political theory, do not make a claims for the rectification of all property they 
once owned.  This realism on the part of indigenous peoples may need explanation by 
scholars, but Waldron‘s suggestion that they should abandon all historical injustice claims 
ever in the hope of distributive justice seems far-fetched.  Indeed, Waldron‘s suggestion 
seems positively horrid given both the history of social policy practice toward indigenous 
peoples in settler societies, and those societies continuing inability to reconcile even basic 
health disparities between indigenous and non-indigenous peoples.  Battling windmills, 
and taking many Sancho‘s with him, Waldron‘s supersession thesis speaks to an 
imaginary claim of an all too real people, who have been caricatured too much already.   
At the other end of the spectrum of the political theory of indigenous rights are 
the arguments of James Tully.  Tully argues forcefully for special and wide-ranging rights 
for indigenous peoples on the basis of historic injustice.  He claims that ‗the struggle for 
recognition as self-governing first nations is not only a struggle to right an injustice… it 
is also a struggle to reclaim their traditional lands to practise their customary forms of 
land use.‘17 Tully‘s thesis is that Locke‘s theories of government and property were used 
as part of a contestation over the status of Amerindian property rights and political status 
by litigants and polemicists to advance colonial claims, and that these same conceptions 
continue today to drive the perpetuation of the injustice today.18    First, Locke gave 
                                                 
16 See for example, the pulling of the punch in E. T. Durie, "Waitangi: Justice and Reconciliation" (paper 
presented at the School of Aboriginal and Islander Administration, University of South Australia: "Second 
David Unaipon Lecture", Adelaide, 10 October 1991)..  International or comparative surveys of indigenous 
claims include Roger C. A. Maaka and Augie Fleras, The Politics of Indigeneity : Challenging the State in Canada 
and Aotearoa New Zealand (Dunedin: University of Otago Press, 2005); Miguel Alfonso Martinez, 
"Discimination against Indigenous Peoples: Study on Treaties, Agreements and Other Constructive 
Arrangements between States and Indigenous Populations,"  (United Nation Economic and Social 
Council: Commission on Human Rights, 1995); Ronald Niezen, The Origins of Indigenism : Human Rights and 
the Politics of Identity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003)..  Information on indigenous peoples 
involved in ethnic conflict has been collected as part of the Minorities At Risk Dataset project at The 
Centre for International Development and Conflict Management at the University of  Maryland (see 
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/). 
17 James Tully, An Approach to Political Philosophy : Locke in Contexts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993), 138. 
18 James Tully, "Aboriginal Property and Western Theory: Recovering a Middle Ground," in Property Rights, 
ed. Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D. Miller, and Jeffrey Paul (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 
153-80; Tully, An Approach to Political Philosophy. Extensions of this research can be found in Barbara Arneil, 
John Locke and America : The Defence of English Colonialism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996); Vicki Hsueh, 
"Cultivating and Challenging the Common: Lockean Property, Indigenous Traditionalisms, and the 
Problem of Exclusion", Contemporary Political Theory, vol. 5 (2006), 193-214.  In this section I have started 
with the original articles in which Tully discussed Locke and the colonisation of what is now know as 
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sophisticated expression to the idea that excluded Amerindian government did not 
qualify as a ‗legitimate form of political society.‘ Second, Locke‘s property theory justified 
the claim that Amerindian ‗customary land use‘ is ‗not a legitimate type of property.‘ 19   
This seems straightforward, even if one could remark that Locke‘s target for the Two 
Treatises was not the Permanent Forum for Indigenous Peoples at the UN, but the 
peculiar circumstances of English monarchical succession in seventeenth century. 20  Yet, 
Tully goes further and makes that claim that these are matters of injustice to be rectified 
today, and that the rectification means the reassertion of the particular rights of 
indigenous self-determination (self governance) that were removed by colonial 
governments. 
Reviewing similar claims about Australian history, an Australian scholar has 
noted that ‗the critical charge comes from the counterfactual claim that a great deal of 
suffering would have been avoided if only the colonists had acted more adroitly.21  
Indeed, Tully does seem to suggest a great deal of wickedness would have been avoided 
(and would be avoided in the future) had the colonists followed the moral guidance that 
‗can be theoretically reconstructed and defended‘ from the ‗classic enunciation of the 
Aboriginal and common-law system‘ provided by the ‗Royal Proclamation, and Chief 
Justice Marshall‘s interpretation of it‘ in the 1820s and 30s.22   Put more bluntly, Tully 
argues that if the colonists had our moral colour and guidance (since as he notes, the 
                                                                                                                                            
North America, rather than his later summary of those arguments in James Tully, Strange Multiplicity : 
Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity, The John Robert Seeley Lectures (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), see especially 70-78.   He concludes the relevant section of that later book by 
claiming that ‗Locke‘s account covers over the real history of the interaction of European imperialism and 
Aboriginal resistance.  The invasion of America, usurpation of Aboriginal nations, theft of the continent, 
imposition of European economic and political systems…‘ Tully, Strange Multiplicity : Constitutionalism in an 
Age of Diversity, 78.  While his words hardly do justice to the events, amongst other issues one could raise as 
a political theorist, one might be tempted to ask how could Locke know about these awful events?  The 
rhetorical charge is more pressing than one might guess at first glance; it is a metaphor that invokes 
holocaust deniers.  Beyond the rhetoric there is a more important and scholarly question to pursue about 
the representation of indigenous peoples and politics in Tully‘s text:  are we really meant to assume that the 
inability of indigenous political authorities to protect their peoples‘ property is a historical fact usefully 
thought about through the lenses of 21st century constitutionalism?  Surely the point is to consider what 
constitutionalism best meets the needs of today, given such historical injustice.  It is an especially strange 
claim for Tully to make since his constructivist interpretation of Locke discards historic entitlement to 
property rights on the basis that Locke cannot have been as absurd as to think that people with no 
property would accept a government that protects those with property. Thus, Tully knows that historical 
arguments (since he jettisons them in his interpretation of Locke), are fertile ground for conflict, not 
constitutionalism.   
19 Tully, An Approach to Political Philosophy, 139. 
20 Tully, "Aboriginal Property and Western Theory: Recovering a Middle Ground.";Tully, 1993 #303}  
21 Paul Muldoon, "Thinking Responsibility Differently: Reconciliation and the Tragedy of Colonization", 
Journal of Intercultural Studies, vol. 26, no. 3 (2005), 244. Muldoon cites as a source for this idea Tim Rouse, 
"Historians and the Humanitarian Critique of Australia's Colonisation", The Australian Journal of 
Anthropology, vol. 14, no. 2 (2003), 253-58. 
22 Tully, "Aboriginal Property and Western Theory: Recovering a Middle Ground," 173. 
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morality he recommends is a reconstruction of past court decisions) they would have not 
treated indigenous peoples so badly. On the basis of the recent legal historiographical 
work, there is much that could be said about Tully‘s reconstruction of North American 
law. Not least, as McHugh puts it, that ‗Men, not law, caused the suffering of aboriginal 
peoples.‘ 23  But the point I wish to highlight, is that in seeking guidance as to indigenous 
political aspirations, Tully has turned not to contemporary aboriginal voices, but to 
historic legal judgements in American courts.   
On the basis of his reading of the court judgements he has surveyed Tully argues 
that if Aboriginal peoples were accepted by the judges as, 
self-governing nations with ownership of their territories; then it follows from the 
central theory of the Two Treatises itself that they have the right to defend themselves and 
their property, with force if necessary.24  
On first reading, this seems a reasonable proposition.  It is, after all, the 
assumption upon which is founded the non-interference doctrine of the modern 
international state system.  Yet, if political theory is to take seriously the agency of 
indigenous peoples, such that they are seen both historically and today as self-governing, 
sovereign nations as Tully suggests, his frame is woefully inadequate to the task of 
justifying both the claim of historical injustice, and the claim that rights of self-
government should be restored.25   
Using his close textual analysis of colonist rhetoric Locke, Tully can explicate the 
political actions of some colonial political actors. Yet he only glances at indigenous 
actions, neither explaining them, nor assigning them any weight.  Indeed, upon reflection  
the violence done to the agency of indigenous peoples in Tully‘s text is quite 
extraordinary.  It is as if we are supposed to imagine that the colonial empire simply 
subjugated all indigenous people everywhere, with no trouble, and without any 
interaction?  Lyndsay Head discussing similar presentist histories in New Zealand 
                                                 
23 Commenting on the shift from fluidity of common law to a positivistic approach in law McHugh notes 
‗abject fate of aboriginal peoples would have occurred irrespective of the change in the method and 
language of legal practice and thought… unleashed economic growth in two mighty empires, British and 
American, and its unquenchable thirst for land justified laws explained by a motley, fluid and far from 
coherent or consistent cobble of intellectualizing... Men, not law, caused the suffering of aboriginal 
peoples.‘ P. G. McHugh, Aboriginal Societies and the Common Law : A History of Sovereignty, Status, and Self-
Determination (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 31-32. 
24 Tully, An Approach to Political Philosophy, 175. 
25 For while the frame demonstrates Locke‘s use in justifying some colonial actions, it does not explain why 
the principles that Tully finds in the Royal Proclamation and the Marshall jurisprudence were not followed, 
since both Marshall and the Royal Proclamation, as he wants to show, owe something to the consent based 
ideas of Locke.  This is notwithstanding the violence Tully does to idea of indigenous peoples as agents in 
their own right:  while he gives them much normative sovereignty, he merely nods via the ‗great peace‘ to 
their actual intentions and agency in a complex history of 300 years.   
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suggests the view that during colonial times indigenous peoples merely acted in 
traditional terms ‗silences Maori history at the point at which it in fact began to speak 
with a new voice.‘ 26   To put it more directly: Tully suggests that aboriginal society was 
sovereign, with its own system of property rights.  Under a Lockean theory of consent, 
the failure of that indigenous government to protect that system of property rights meant 
that the government had failed, and its people were without legitimate governance.  That 
is, the very moralising theory Tully thinks can justify indigenous self-government, actually 
suggests that indigenous political authorities lost their legitimacy, because they failed to 
protect their subjects property rights against others‘ arbitrary takings. 
A failure of indigenous government is clearly not what Tully had in mind in 
making his argument about indigenous sovereignty, but that is where his argument leads.  
His argument is led there because his moralising about indigenous peoples takes little to 
no account of their actual history, historical statements or political claims today: not 
broad based statements about indigenous rights, such as in the United Nations 
declaration, but about what self-determination might mean to individuals who are 
indigenous. 
A response to the misrepresentations of political theory 
What is the response to such misrepresentations? It would be easy at this point to 
jump to fashionable politics of recognition.27  Yet, for contemporary problems, at least in 
the places with which I am familiar, recognition is the start, not the end of racism. And 
while I might whakapapa, I would like to presume that my indigenous identity is 
unimportant to my individual citizenship, and my right to self-determine. 
If recognition, and political moralism are not suitable for the production of 
indigenous rights, what then? As I suggested at the outset, I think the answer is to ask 
about the very purpose of politics for indigenous peoples. The great minimal state 
theorist of the twentieth century, Robert Nozick, suggested that answering this question 
for all peoples, ‗involves showing …[the state]to be prudentially rational, morally 
acceptable or both‘.28 In Bernard Williams‘ writing, Nozick‘s question is ‗the ―first‖ 
political question‘ of providing ‗order, protection, safety, trust, and the conditions of 
                                                 
26 Lyndsay Head, "The Pursuit of Modernity in Maori Society," in Histories, Power and Loss : Uses of the Past : 
A New Zealand Commentary, ed. Andrew Sharp and Paul G. McHugh (Wellington, N.Z.: Bridget Williams 
Books, 2001), 102. 
27 See Charles  Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," in Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, 
ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); James Tully, "Public Philosophy in a 
New Key. Volume 1, Democracy and Civic Freedom,"  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); 
Tully, Strange Multiplicity : Constitutionalism in an Age of Diversity. 
28 Simmons, Justification and Legitimacy, 123. 
11/16 
 
cooperation‘.29  Only once the state can be justified to individuals on this basis, as 
Williams‘ pointed out, can other political questions be raised, such as what should be the 
moral colour - the particular morality - of a state.  Justifying political authority in this 
sense provides compelling reasons why it is better for citizens to live within the 
protection of a political authority than to live in an anarchical society.  This places some 
emphasis on the authority not to create problems for its citizens that outweigh their fears 
of anarchy, so it must continually justify its coercive power. On this view all one needs to 
ask is whether the modern state answers, or is capable of answering, that first political 
question for indigenous peoples; is the acquiescing to state morally rational, and 
prudential for indigenous peoples? Or in Williams‘ terms does the state provide 
indigenous peoples with order, protection, safety, trust, and the conditions of 
cooperation. Before directly asking that question of indigenous peoples themselves, it is 
pointless to act as philosopher kings and moralise about how our society should treat 
indigenous peoples: they are quite capable of moralising themselves. Instead, we should 
note the saurian truth of Hamlet‘s comment to Horatio, and recognise that it is not the 
task of political theory to characterise the cultures of indigenous peoples.30   
Allowing the subject to determine their own politics 
Political theory, and thus government policy, should not try to encompass a 
culture, let alone the multiple cultures of indigenous people.  Instead, it is the indigenous 
peoples who encompass their culture and their internal politics, and the best that a state 
might do is suggest why its institutions answer the political aspirations of indigenous 
peoples.  This would of course involve asking what those aspirations might be.  Kirsty 
Gover, one of the few scholars who has done empirical work in this area – analysing 
over 700 indigenous constitutions to see how indigenous people actually constitute 
themselves and their governance entities outside of the rhetorical demands of claims-
making – sees the creation of indigenous peoples‘ institutions within the state as the 
hardest of all problems for the government to solve. 31  States tend to insist on a defined 
indigenous institution, but the state‘s insistence on that product creates such massive 
                                                 
29 Williams, In the Beginning, 3. 
30 As some scholars recognised years ago:  C Kukathas, "Liberalism and Multiculturalism: The Politics of 
Indifference", Political Theory, vol. 26, no. 5 (1998); C Kukathas, "Are There Any Cultural Rights?", Political 
Theory, vol. 20, no. 1 (1992). 
31 Of course many scholars use indigenous court claims to be empirical work.  Given the distortions 
necessary for claims by indigenous peoples to enter the courts, this seems rather like journalists claiming to 
have sources while using press releases as the basis for their work. 
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distortionary incentives, that the very people the government is attempting to assist to 
achieve autonomy, lose their self-determination over their group boundaries.32  
Conclusion: reconciliation through the provision of a legitimate state. 
Given the difficulty of the states‘ relationships with indigenous peoples, one 
might be tempted to suggest that the government should get out of the business 
altogether of indigenous affairs.  Although this would not necessarily be 
counterproductive for indigenous peoples since they would be would left unmoralised, 
the state itself would continue to question its own legitimacy; at least in this neo-liberal 
moment. For the legitimacy of the modern settler state is tied uniquely and precisely to 
the existence and status of indigenous peoples.  If a state is justified by its defence of 
property rights, then its legitimacy depends upon the upholding of property rights.  
Indigenous claims for ancient property rights on this understanding are not of 
fundamental concern because they raise the question of ‗is your society fair?‘,  they are 
fundamental challenges for the modern state because they raise the question for 
indigenous groups of ‗why should we obey?‘   
The point is more explicit the other way around.  Modern liberal governments 
and societies tend to believe that; people own themselves and their labour, and that a 
Government‘s role is to set property rules, administer the rule of law, and allow 
spontaneous orders (or markets) to luxuriate in the freedom that they deserve as a result 
of their functionality.  Amongst other principles to which this ideology must adhere, one 
is the idea, noted earlier as Locke‘s creation, that the reason for government is that it 
protects an individual‘s property rights against arbitrary taking.33 Or to put it more 
formally – if a citizen‘s property rights are not protected, the citizen is no longer under a 
political obligation, but instead stateless, ungoverned and unprotected.  A state or 
political authority that is unable to protect its citizens property rights is illegitimate.  As 
Locke taught us, our consent to governance is our safeguard against tyranny, and for 
such safeguards, based as they are on political equality – the equality of political 
citizenship – we are prepared to sacrifice economic equality.  The twentieth century 
                                                 
32 See, for example the disputes over the Fisheries Settlement in New Zealand.  Kirsty Gover, Tribal 
Constitutionalism: States, tribes and Membership Governance (Forthcoming, 2010, Oxford University Press).  Some 
of the arguments of the book are presented in K Gover, "Comparative Tribal Constitutionalism: 
Membership Governance in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States", Law & Social Inquiry, 
vol. 35, no. 3 (2010). 
33 Which is why such an ideology is antagonistic to the welfare state, since taxation (most famously in 
Nozick‘s version of this libertarianism) is arbitrary taking. Cf. Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia 
(Oxford: B. Blackwell, 1974); Jeffrey Paul, Reading Nozick : Essays on Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Philosophy and 
Society (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1981). 
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proved awfully and tragically that this liberal paradox was correct: equal political rights 
(to freedom) mean we cannot enforce economic equality.  This should be remembered 
by those who moralise the politics of indigeneity, in the hope of doing justice to 
indigenous peoples.34    
This bears repeating,  to believe in the classical liberal idea of the state 
necessitates resolving indigenous property, because otherwise, there is no reason for 
indigenous peoples to consent to the modern state, since up to this point, the state has 
not protected indigenous property rights.  As I have suggested when critiquing the co-
option of indigenous peoples by scholars wishing to attack globalisation and neo-liberal 
reforms, it is precisely the state‘s embrace of those ideologies that raises the question of 
the state‘s control of property rights, allowing the Treaty settlement process to expand.35 
For without the consent of indigenous peoples, without legitimacy, (derived at the very 
least from reparations over its failure to protect property rights), without a sure 
foundation on its property claims, there is every reason for indigenous individuals to 
consider the market-liberal state a raider, a conquistador, and to assume that the state will 
continue to dictate to its non-consenting citizens how they will be governed; forcing, if 
you like, them to be free, with all the moral horror that such a phrase can suggest.   
Reconciliation through indigenous self-determination 
The settler states of Australia, of New Zealand, of the US or Canada, have a 
sizable population who have no necessary reason to consent to being governed, and 
from whom the state must seek that consent before they can possibly be legitimate 
states.  Thus the difficulty of the politics of indigeneity, for indigenous-government 
relations, is not based upon differences in culture or worldview or even history, but 
differences in political obligation.  On the upside of this ferocious problem there is an 
obvious path to reconciliation, at least at the levels I have already addressed. The settler 
state needs to put in place institutions which are able to answer concerns of indigenous 
peoples by ensuring equality before the law, and self-determination of indigenous 
                                                 
34 Istvan Hont, Jealousy of Trade : International Competition and the Nation State in Historical Perspective 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005), 92. For Hont, Locke set the stage 
for Smith‘s ‗paradox of commercial society; that economic inequality was a paradox because it drove a 
wedge between the traditional egalitarian intuitions of Western moral thought and the guiding assumptions 
of modern political economy.  The success of commercial society was counterintuitive to those who 
expected that political and economic equality must somehow proceed hand in hand.  The new idiom 
suggested, instead, that legal and political equality could coexist with economic inequality without causing 
endemic instability in modern Western state. ―Liberalism‖, as this new political form came to be called… 
could even be defined by the coexistence of political and legal equality and significant inequality in the very 
same polity.‘ Hont, Jealousy of Trade, 92. 
35 Lindsey Te Ata o Tu MacDonald and P. Muldoon, "Globalisation, Neo-Liberalism and the Struggle for 
Indigenous Citizenship", Australian Journal of Political Science, vol. 41, no. 2 (2006). 
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institutions (which, in fact, is all the reconciliation we should ever expect from anybody 
in politics). It will be difficult for the state to ameliorate indigenous concerns over their 
political status given the historical and ongoing racialised treatment of indigenous 
peoples honoured more in the breach that drove the processes of dispossession and 
exclusion from the polity.  But at least now we are clear that legitimacy is the state‘s 
problem, and indigenous peoples, like any peoples, or individuals, have the right to voice 
and self-determination to moralise their own existence.  
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